Analysis of safeguards verification challenges for long-life Small Modular Reactor cores

Introduction

The deployment of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) has gained significant attention as a promising solution for low-carbon, reliable, and flexible nuclear power generation. Among the innovative features of several advanced SMR concepts is the adoption of long-life reactor cores, which are designed to operate for extended periods – up to ten years or more – without refueling. While these designs may offer potential economic, operational, and proliferation-resistance advantages by reducing fuel handling and transportation, they also introduce new challenges for the implementation of nuclear safeguards.

Existing safeguards approaches developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have largely been optimized for water-cooled reactors with annual or biennial refueling cycles, where periodic access to nuclear material enables routine verification of nuclear material inventory. The introduction of long operating cycles therefore raises important questions regarding the adequacy of current safeguards methodologies and verification strategies.

Research question: How do long operating cycles affect the ability of inspectors to verify nuclear material inventories?

Objectives:

• Compare safeguards requirements for annual refueling reactors with 10–year core-life concepts
• Examine continuity-of-knowledge requirements
• Evaluate inspector access frequency
• Discuss implications for safeguards implementation